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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of economic evaluation on the reimbursement 
process for pharmaceuticals. Before the introduction of economic evaluation, a range of 
arrangements existed across different jurisdictions, varying from reimbursement based on clinical 
criteria alone and price controls, to a total absence of controls over price or reimbursement.  The 
changes in the structure of reimbursement policies necessary to incorporate economic evaluation 
have been accomplished without major difficulty in most jurisdictions. However, several 
methodological differences in international guidelines for economic evaluation exist, only some of 
which can easily be justified. A number of beneficial changes in reimbursement processes have also 
been observed, such as a trend towards requiring the measurement of more meaningful clinical 
endpoints and increased engagement between manufacturers, drug regulators and payers. A 
consistent finding in studies of reimbursement decisions is that economic considerations have been 
influential, second only to the strength of the clinical evidence for the drug of interest. The impact of 
economic evaluation on the allocation of healthcare resources is hard to ascertain because of the 
difficulties in specifying the counterfactual and the fact that little is known about the extent to which 
reimbursement decisions actually lead to changes in healthcare practice. However, there is evidence 
that economic evaluation has assisted price negotiations and enabled reimbursement agencies to 
target drugs to those patients who will benefit the most. In publicly financed healthcare systems, an 
evidence-based system of pricing and reimbursement for drugs, considering societal willingness-to-
pay, is a reasonable policy objective to pursue. 
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1. Introduction   
In 1991 the Commonwealth of Australia announced that, from January 1993, economic analyses 
would be required in submissions to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC), the 
body that advises the minister on the listing of drugs on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Schedule (the 
national formulary of publicly-subsidized drugs). A new set of submission guidelines, including 
economic analyses, was produced (Department of Health, Commonwealth of Australia, 1992) and 
submissions were invited initially on a voluntary basis.  
 
Since that time this policy has become fairly widespread, with approximately half the countries in 
the European Union requesting economic analyses to varying degrees, plus New Zealand and various 
Canadian provinces. In the last five years several payers in the US and countries in Latin America and 
Asia have also expressed an interest in receiving economic data.  
 
Although economists have advised governments for many years, particularly in the area of 
healthcare financing, the requirement for economic analyses as part of the reimbursement process 
was regarded by many as a big step forward in the recognition of the importance of economic 
considerations in healthcare decision-making. However, it has not been without its detractors. Birch 
and Gafni (2007) have consistently argued against the policy, at least in the way it has been 
ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚŚĂǀĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŝƚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝƐƚƐ ?ŶŝŐŚƚŵĂƌĞ ? ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?DŽƌŐĂŶet al (2000) 
ŚĂǀĞ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝƐƚƐ ŵĂǇ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ  ‘ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚ ? ďǇ ƚŚĞ ƉŚĂƌmaceutical industry and that, 
rather than representing an additional barrier to the industry, economic analysis has been used to 
ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŵŽƐƚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇ ? ƚŚĞ ƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂǀĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚ
from the use of economic analysis, and the analytic techniques behind them, have been widely 
criticised by economists and others.  
 
dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌƌĞǀŝĞǁƐƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ-ďĂƐĞĚƌĞŝŵďƵƌƐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ
20 years and assesses what, if anything has been achieved. It begins with a brief discussion of the 
state of the world before the widespread use of economic evaluation and then discusses the 
changes that have been brought about, in the decision-making structure for reimbursement, the 
processes involved and the outcomes, in terms of reimbursement decisions and the resulting 
allocation of healthcare resources in the jurisdictions concerned. 
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2. Pricing and reimbursement of drugs before economic evaluation  
Some countries that subsequently adopted economic evaluation had pre-existing pricing and 
reimbursement controls. For example, the PBAC already existed in Australia and was making 
comparative clinical assessments of products prior to the introduction of economic considerations. 
The same situation existed in New Zealand and several Canadian provinces.  
 
Some countries, such as France had, and still have, price controls based on the added clinical value 
that the product brings, as compared with existing drugs for the clinical indication concerned. If the 
product brings no added value the best the company can expect is an equivalent price.  
 
Some countries, such as The Netherlands, had a therapeutic reference price system, where similar 
ĚƌƵŐƐĂƌĞ ‘ĐůƵƐƚĞƌĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƌĞŝŵďƵƌƐĞĚĂƚƚhe same level. When economic evaluation was introduced 
in The Netherlands, it was used to help set a price for drugs that could not be placed in an existing 
cluster.  
 
Finally, there were some countries, such as the United Kingdom, where the vast majority of new 
drugs were automatically reimbursed by the health care system, with prices being regulated 
indirectly by the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, which controlled the overall level of 
company profits. However, in the UK and many other healthcare systems, the use of drugs was also 
regulated at the local level, through the existence of local formularies and budgetary controls on 
ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? dŚŝƐ ůĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƐƉƌĞĂĚ ŽĨ  ‘ƉŽƐƚĐŽĚĞ ƉƌĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐ ? ? ǁŚĞƌĞďǇ ƐŽŵĞ ĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞ
medications were available in one locality, but not others. Indeed, this was one of the problems that 
the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) was created to rectify.  
 
Therefore, in only a minority of jurisdictions was there a completely unrestricted use of new 
medications before the introduction of reimbursement systems including economic evaluation. We 
will return to this point later, when we consider the impact that this new policy has had on the 
allocation of healthcare resources. 
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3. Changes in the decision-making structure of reimbursement  
Committee structure  
With the advent of economic evaluation, there were two main changes in the decision-making 
structure.  First, the composition of existing expert committees was changed or new committees 
created, in order to add economic expertise. In some jurisdictions, such as Australia, an economics 
sub-committee was formed to advise the PBAC.  In the UK the NICE Appraisal Committee was 
formed.  However, the majority membership of committees has remained clinical, including 
practising physicians and epidemiologists.  
  
This begs the question of what impact the addition of a minority of economists has made. The most 
detailed analysis of the work of such a committee is the study by Bryan et al (2007) of the NICE 
Appraisal Committee. They found that economic considerations (eg. the Incremental Cost-
ĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ZĂƚŝŽ  ?/Z ? ƋƵŝĐŬůǇ ďĞĐĂŵĞ ƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚ ŝŶƚŚĞ ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?Ɛ ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ
some economist committee members did express frustrations that issues of opportunity cost were 
not being adequately addressed. There were also some limits on the level of influence of the 
economic considerations, owing to the perceived methodological weaknesses in the economic 
analyses presented to the Committee.  
  
Submission guidelines  
The other major change in structure was the amendment of existing submission guidelines, or the 
creation of new guidelines, to accommodate the need for economic analyses. It is worth noting that, 
even now, the bulk of the submission of data in all jurisdictions relates to the clinical data, with the 
economic analysis comprising only one section of the submission.  
  
There have been several studies comparing the methodological content of the various jurisdiction-
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ‘ƉŚĂƌŵĂĐŽĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ?ŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ ? ?^ĞĞHjelmgren et al, 1991; Sculpher and Drummond, 2006; 
Barbieri et al, 2010). In addition, the most extensive review and classification of the content of the 
guidelines can be found on the website of the International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and 
Outcomes Research (ISPOR, 2011).  
  
The general conclusion of these reviews is that most of the guidelines embody the main 
methodological principles of economic evaluation, but that they differ in detail. Sculpher and 
Drummond (2006) note that some of these differences are understandable, since they relate to local 
preferences (eg. over whether the perspective for analysis should be confined to the healthcare 
sector, or should be broader, including costs and benefits from a societal perspective).  
  
However, some of the inter-jurisdiction differences are less easy to explain and may reflect a lack of 
understanding of the methodological principles. For example, Barbieri et al (2010) noted that, in 
discussing issues of the cross-jurisdictional transferability of clinical data, 50 per cent of the 
guidelines they reviewed did not make the key distinction between data on baseline risk of disease 
and data on relative clinical effect. In general, the more detailed the scrutiny of the methods 
guidelines, the greater the differences that emerge. In a recent study, Mauskopf et al (2011) argue 
that these differences are substantial enough as to cause difficulties for a manufacturer wishing to 
make submissions to satisfy the requirements in several jurisdictions. 
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4. Changes in reimbursement processes  
Evaluation of economic submissions  
The main change following the incorporation of economic evaluation was that industry submissions 
had to include an economic analysis, conducted in a manner consistent with the methodological 
guidelines in each jurisdiction. This has not been without its difficulties. For example, in a review of 
326 pharmacoeconomic analyses submitted to the PBAC, Hill et al (2000) identified 249 
methodological problems. On the other hand, Lim et al (2010) found, in a review of 153 economic 
evaluations published between 2001 and 2006, a base set of nine methodological standards, as 
outlined in the Canadian guidelines (CADTH, 2006), were followed in more than 50 per cent of the 
cases.  
  
The other main challenge has been in the evaluation of the industry submissions received. In some 
jurisdictions this evaluation is conducted by staff within the government, or the relevant health 
technology assessment (HTA) agency. In others the evaluation is conducted by an independent 
individual or group, normally (but not always) based in an academic institution. This raises the 
question as to how thorough, and time consuming, that review should be. Initially, NICE in the UK 
provided substantial funding for independent academic groups to conduct their own study and to 
compare it with the industry submission(s). A comparison conducted by NICE (Miners et al, 2005) 
showed that on the majority of occasions the estimate of cost-effectiveness of the product was 
more favourable in the industry submission than in the equivalent independent study, suggesting 
some important differences in the interpretation of the data.  
  
More recently, NICE has fallen into line with the majority of jurisdictions, which require only a 
critique of the industry submission, as opposed to an independent study. Some analysts have taken 
advantage of the natural experiment that took place in the UK, whereby in Scotland the Scottish 
Medicines Consortium (SMC) has only requested critiques, whereas in England NICE initially required 
independent studies. Cairns (2006) found very little difference between the resulting decisions of 
NICE and the SMC, whereas Barbieri et al (2009) found important differences between the two 
bodies, with NICE placing more restrictions in use on the drugs that were approved.  
  
Developments in processes  
There have been several developments in reimbursement processes over the last 20 years and it is 
interesting to discuss which of these are likely to be closely associated with the incorporation of 
economic evaluation. Three developments in particular are quite likely to have occurred as a result 
of the use of economic analyses.  
  
First, there has been a trend towards the consideration of price (of the new drug) as a variable in the 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂ ‘ǀĂůƵĞ-ďĂƐĞĚƉƌŝĐĞ ? ?ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ
Health, 2010). Previously, in any assessments of the clinical data alone, price was considered as an 
exogenous variable determined by the manufacturer, or something to be negotiated separately by 
the ministry or other payer.  
  
^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶĂ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ŝŶ  ‘ƌŝƐŬ-ƐŚĂƌŝŶŐ ?ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ǁŚĞƌĞďǇ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ĚƌƵŐ ŝƐ ŐŝǀĞŶ
reimbursement, but only on the understanding that further research will be conducted to determine 
whether it constitutes good value for money. (The presumption is that the price might be lowered 
unless adequate value for money is established in the long run.) These arrangements are not 
without their difficulties (Raftery, 2010; Towse, 2010), but it is hard to understand how they could 
even be applied without having a policy of economic evaluation to identify the situations whether 
risk-sharing might be appropriate and to undertake the required research.  
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Thirdly, the perceived success of incorporating economic evaluation into the reimbursement of 
drugs has led to its extension to other technologies. For example, in the United Kingdom, NICE now 
evaluates medical devices, diagnostic services and public health interventions (NICE, 2011).  
  
In addition, there have been other developments in reimbursement approaches in which the 
incorporation of economic evaluation has most likely had a major influence, although it may not 
have been the sole, primary, cause.  
  
First, there has been a growing recognition of the need for more relevant endpoints to be measured 
in clinical trials of new drugs. Many of the clinical trials undertaken for drug licensing purposes 
measure disease progression or surrogate endpoints. The need, in economic evaluation, for data on 
the impact of therapies on length and quality of life has led to a reconsideration of clinical trial 
design. More recently, this trend has manifested itself in a movement towards early engagement (of 
manufacturers) with payers on the issue of data requirements and the development of parallel 
advice (to manufacturers) from drug regulators and payers on the most appropriate clinical trial 
design (Backhouse et al, 2011).  
  
Secondly, there has been much more discussion of the range of relevant treatment alternatives (to 
the new drug of interest) and the need for evidence on relative treatment effect. In turn, this has led 
to discussion of the needs for adequate methods of evidence synthesis, particularly in situations 
where head-to-head clinical trials do not exist for the alternative therapies under consideration.  
  
This review (of randomised trials) has gone well beyond the methods initially pioneered by the 
Cochrane Collaboration, to include Bayesian methods of indirect and mixed treatment comparisons 
(now being called network meta-analysis) (Jansen et al, 2011). In the main this research has not 
been led by economists, but largely arises from the need, in economic evaluation,  to consider 
relevant treatment comparisons, as opposed to those made in the existing clinical trials.  
  
Thirdly, there has been a growing recognition that clinical and cost-effectiveness can vary by patient 
sub-groups. Prior to the incorporation of economic evaluation, in all but a few jurisdictions a drug 
would be approved for reimbursement within its licensed indications, which could often be quite 
broad. The consideration of cost-effectiveness has thrown into sharper relief the fact that a given 
drug could deliver high value for money in one patient sub-group, but offer almost no added value 
(compared to the alternatives) in another patient sub-group. This is evidenced by much of the 
guidance issued by agencies considering economic evaluations, where in many cases the use of the 
drug is restricted within its licensed indication (see later).  
  
Finally, over time there has been a trend toward more transparency and stakeholder involvement in 
reimbursement processes (Drummond et al, 2008). It would be wrong to attribute this mainly to 
economics, but it is clear that the addition of the economic dimension to decision-making has meant 
that decisions have become more complex to explain. It is easy for the public to accept that a drug 
does not generate clinical benefit, or does more harm than good. However, it is harder for them to 
accept that, while the drug is clinically superior to the alternative, the added value does not justify 
the additional cost.  
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5. Changes in reimbursement decisions  
There is a growing literature on the impact that the inclusion of economic evaluation has had on the 
decisions of reimbursement agencies. This can be divided into: descriptive studies (either within one 
jurisdiction or comparing jurisdictions); multivariate analyses; and qualitative analyses (including 
stated preference studies).  
  
Descriptive analyses  
These studies seek to describe, or explain, the reimbursement decisions in different jurisdictions and 
to assess the importance of economic considerations. For example, Mason and Drummond (2009) 
ĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚE/ ?ƐŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞŽŶŶĞǁĐĂŶĐĞƌĚƌƵŐƐĨƌŽŵDĂǇ ? ? ? ?ƚŽDĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞǇĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚ ? ?
per cent of the drugs were allowed for unrestricted use within their licensed indications, 15 per cent 
were totally restricted, and 29 per cent allowed with some restrictions (eg. for only sub-sets of the 
patient population). The reasons for restrictions, where these could be determined, are given in 
Figure 1. It can be seen that issues related to the ICER were prominent, but that methodological 
concerns and insufficient evidence of effectiveness were also very important. This reinforces the 
point, made earlier, that reimbursement committees view the adequacy of the clinical data 
somewhat differently than licensing agencies.  
 
 
Source:  Mason & Drummond (2009) 
Figure 1.  Reasons for NICE restrictions: % drug evaluations (N=24) 
 
 
Anell and Persson (2005) studied the decisions of the Swedish drug reimbursement agency (the LFN) 
from October 2002 to March 2005. Of 107 drugs considered, 13 were rejected, 12 given limited 
listing and 82 were approved with no restrictions on use within the licence. Cost-effectiveness 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?ďƵƚŽƚŚĞƌĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ‘ĐůŝŶŝĐĂůŶĞĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ? ? 
  
Several studies have compared the decisions made in different jurisdictions. Lexchin and Mintzes 
(2008) compared the recommendations of the PBAC in Australia, the SMC in Scotland the Common 
Drug Review (CDR) in Canada. Overall there were no statistically significant differences between the 
agencies in the percentage of drugs assigned to the three categories (no restriction, restricted listing 
and no listing). However, the comparisons are complicated by the fact that different drugs were 
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considered in each jurisdiction over the time period studied. The recommendations for the drugs 
that were assessed by all three agencies did show some discordance (see Figure 2).  
 
Recommendation as of September 2006 
Drug CDR PBAC SMC 
CDR, PBAC, SMC Concordant    
Adalimumab Restricted Restricted Restricted 
Atazanavir Restricted Restricted Restricted 
Brimonidine/timolol Restricted Restricted Restricted 
Cinacalet No No No 
Laronidase No No No 
Memantine No No No 
Pegfilgrastim Restricted Restricted Restricted 
Tenofovir Restricted Restricted Restricted 
Voriconazole Restricted Restricted Restricted 
CDR and PBAC Concordant, SMC Discordant    
Abacavir/lamivudine Restricted Restricted Yes 
Atomoxetine No No Restricted 
Efalizumab Restricted Restricted No 
Fosamprenavir Restricted Restricted Yes 
Mycophenolate sodium Restricted Restricted Yes 
Teriparatide (rDNA origin) No No Restricted 
Travoprost and timolol Restricted Restricted Yes 
CDR and SMC Concordant, PBAC Discordant    
Erlotinib Restricted No Restricted 
Pregabalin No Restricted No 
Tipranavir Restricted No Restricted 
PBAC and SMC Concordant, CDR Discordant    
Insulin aspart/insulin aspart protamine No Yes Yes 
Insulin detemir No Restricted Restricted 
CDR, PBAC, SMC ʹ All Discordant    
Insulin glargine No Yes Restricted 
Legend: CDR = Common Drug Review; PBAC = Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee; SMC = Scottish Medicines 
Consortium; zĞƐA? ‘hŶƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚůŝƐƚŝŶŐ ?Žƌ ‘ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĞĚĨŽƌƵƐĞ ? ? ZĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚA? ‘>ŝƐƚǁŝƚŚĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ? ? ‘ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?Žƌ
 ‘ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĞĚĨŽƌƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚƵƐĞ ? ?EŽA? ‘ĚŽŶŽƚůŝƐƚ ?Žƌ ‘ŶŽƚƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĞĚĨŽƌƵƐĞ ? ? 
Figure 2.  Recommendations for drugs assessed by all three agencies 
 
Clement et al (2009) compared the decisions by NICE, the PBAC and CDR up until the end of 2008. 
Overall, the percentage of drugs listed (unrestricted or with restrictions) was 87.4 per cent for NICE, 
54.3 per cent for the PBAC and 49.6 per cent for the CDR. (The corresponding figures for the sub-set 
of drugs considered by all three agencies were 84 per cent, 73.6 per cent and 52.6 per cent.) The 
authors discuss the potential reasons for these differences and argue that the high rate of listing by 
NICE resulted from the agency being more willing to explore patient sub-groups for which the drug 
was cost-effective. On the other hand, in contrast to the two other agencies, the PBAC was more 
willing to negotiate on price, allowing resubmissions at a lower price, or more willing to recommend 
risk-sharing arrangements. Since the time period studied by Clement et al, NICE appears to have 
ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚƚŚĞW ?ƐůĞĂĚŽŶƉƌŝĐĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝƚƐŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƵƐĞŽĨ ‘ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚĂĐĐĞƐƐƐĐŚĞŵĞƐ ? ?/Ŷ
these schemes a drug that is facing possible rejection can be given positive guidance if a financially 
attractive deal is offered. This can be to offer some courses of therapy free, to cap dosing, or to give 
refunds in situations where the patient does not respond to therapy. Implicitly, many of these 
schemes represent price reductions.  
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Multivariate analysis  
In these analyses the listing decision (expressed as a binomial reject/accept, or a multinomial 
variable relating to the extent of listing) is the dependent variable, with the range of explanatory 
variables typically comprising the quantity and quality of clinical evidence, the disease area, the 
ICER, the number of alternative therapies, the size of the patient population, etc. The aim is to assess 
the relative importance of the various factors in explaining the decision and, in the case of the ICER, 
to estŝŵĂƚĞƚŚĞƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚ ?ŽƌƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚƌĂŶŐĞŽĨ ‘ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞ ?ĐŽƐƚ-effectiveness.  
  
/ŶĂŶĞĂƌůǇ ƐƚƵĚǇ ?ĞǀůŝŶĂŶĚWĂƌŬŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ?ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚE/ ?ƐĐŽƐƚ-effectiveness threshold was 
somewhat higher than the £20,000-£30,000 per QALY gained that was often stated. A later study, 
Dakin et al (2006) showed that interventions supported by more RCTs were more likely to be 
recommended for routine use. Higher ICERs increased the likelihood of rejection, but did not affect 
the decision between routine and restricted use (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Proportion of interventions in each outcome category with a cost per QALY gained (CQG) below a range of ceiling ratios 
(Rc). The vertical axis shows the proportion of appraisals in each category that had a CQG below the ceiling ratio shown on 
the horizontal axis. This is equal to the proportion that would be acceptable at each ceiling ratio ignoring all other factors. 
Source: Dakin et al (2006) 
Figure 3.  Relationship between ceiling ratio and type of NICE recommendation 
 
ƚŚŝƌĚƐƚƵĚǇĨŽĐƵƐƐĞĚŽŶE/ ?Ɛ ‘ŵŝǆĞĚ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ PŶĂŵĞůǇƚŚŽƐĞǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĚƌƵŐǁĂƐƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĞĚ
for use on only a sub-set of the patient population. It was found that, overall, NICE recommended 
use for less than half of the licensed population; in one third of cases the recommendation for use 
ĐŽǀĞƌĞĚůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶ ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞůŝĐĞŶƐĞĚƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?K ?EĞŝůůĂŶĚĞǀůŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?KǀĞƌĂůů ?ŝŶĂůůƚŚĞ
multivariate studies reviewed, the ICER was shown to be a prominent factor in decision-making.   
  
Qualitative studies  
These studies involve interviews with decision-makers, asking them about the reasons for their 
decisions. As mentioned previously, the study by Bryan et al (2007) involving participant observation 
and semi-structured interviews, showed that the ICER was prominent in discussions of the NICE 
Appraisal Committee.  
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A stated preference binary choice experiment with members of the same committee suggested that 
increases in the ICER, economic uncertainty and the availability of other therapies were associated 
with a statistically significant reduction on the odds of a positive recommendation (Tappenden et al, 
2007). Similarly, a discrete choice experiment among Dutch healthcare professionals showed that 
severity of disease, cost per QALY gained, individual health gain and budget impact were the most 
important decision criteria (Koopmanscap et al, 2010).  
  
Evidence of deliberative decision making  
Finally, although all the studies discussed in this section seek, in various ways, to assess the 
importance of economic and other considerations in reaching the decision, feedback from those 
involved in the process points to the deliberative nature of decision-making. Namely, in the 
discussion, various factors, quantified or non-quantified, play a role. Some of the qualitative studies 
begin to throw some light on this, but evidence is sparse. Rawlins and Culyer (2004) give some 
examples of how value judgements (eg. on equity of access to care) influenced decisions of the NICE 
Appraisal Committee.  
  
In addition, a study by George et al (2001) of decisions made by the PBAC showed that, whilst there 
was a clear relationship between the ICER and the likelihood of a drug being rejected, or being 
recommended only if the manufacturer was willing to lower the price, there were several outliers 
(ie. drugs that appeared not to be very cost-effective, yet receiving a positive recommendation, and 
vice versa). They argue that, in its deliberative decision-making process, the committee was giving 
consideration to issues such as the seriousness of the health condition the drug was indicated for, 
the existence (or not) of alternative therapies to the drug under study, the affordability of care to 
patients if the drug was not reimbursed and the overall budgetary impact of the decision to list the 
drug.  
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6. Changes in the allocation of healthcare resources  
Of course, the ultimate test of incorporating economic evaluation into the reimbursement process is 
whether it has improved healthcare provision (eg. has it made the provision of healthcare more 
efficient, more equitable, or both?).  
  
The first problem in addressing this question is that there are often difficulties in implementing the 
decisions made by reimbursement agencies, particularly in the ĐĂƐĞŽĨ ‘ŵŝǆĞĚ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?ŝĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ
the drug is recommended for use, but only for a subset of the patient population). In different 
jurisdictions various mechanisms have been used to enforce adherence to the decisions or 
recommendation of the agencies. These include making guidance mandatory on the healthcare 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŶŐƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚƐƚŽďĞ ‘ŽŶĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?ŝĞ ?ĂůůŽǁĞĚŽŶůǇǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƉŚǇƐŝĐŝĂŶǀĞƌŝĨŝĞƐƚŚĂƚ
the patient meets the eligibility criteria), the use of prescribing incentive schemes, audit of local 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ ‘ƌŝƐŬƐŚĂƌŝŶŐƐĐŚĞŵĞƐ ? ?^ƚƵĚǇŽĨƚŚĞŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŝƐ
sparse, but one study in the UK showed that the implementation of NICE guidance was patchy 
(Sheldon et al, 2004).  
  
The second problem is that, in most healthcare settings, very little is known about the range of 
options facing the physician, or other decision-maker, when considering the implementation of the 
ƌĞŝŵďƵƌƐĞŵĞŶƚĂŐĞŶĐǇ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝĨĂĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-maker in the UK operating under a fixed 
budget, decides to make a given treatment available in accordance with NICE guidance, what is 
actually displaced? It could be a highly cost-effective service, but one which had not been assessed 
by NICE, or it could be another treatment option for which there was no reliable evidence. One 
function of adopting a cost-effectiveness threshold would be to reflect this opportunity cost, but for 
most jurisdictions either no explicit threshold exists, or the basis for establishing the threshold is 
inadequately researched.  
  
Finally, in common with the evaluation of most policy changes, it is difficult to specify the 
counterfactual. Namely, how would decision-making processes in the various jurisdictions have 
developed if economic evaluation had not been incorporated into the reimbursement process. Of 
course, bearing in mind the variations in the state of the world prior to the incorporation of 
economic analyses, the counterfactual may be different for different jurisdictions.  
  
These uncertainties have led some analysts, most notably Birch and Gafni (2007) to argue that the 
 ‘ŶŝŐŚƚŵĂƌĞĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĨĂĐƚƵĂů ?ĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞƌƵůĞĚŽƵƚ ?EĂŵĞůǇ P 
 
 The explicit or implicit decision-making threshold, of acceptable cost-effectiveness, 
has been set higher than that which would have been used by decision-makers 
operating under a budget constraint;  
 As a result of using economic evaluation, manufacturers just priced up to the 
threshold, whereas otherwise prices would have been lower;  
 The process, of considering incremental cost-effectiveness of new products, gave 
attention to technologies of marginal value that would otherwise have been ignored 
by healthcare decision-makers with limited budgets.  
 
There is no straight-forward rebuttal to these arguments. Certainly there is no comprehensive 
analysis that demonstrates that jurisdictions applying economic analysis deliver healthcare in a more 
efficient, or equitable, manner than those who do not. However, evidence can be cited that suggests 
this policy is likely to lead to lower prices for drugs and their more efficient use.  
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The evidence from jurisdictions where economic evaluation has been applied shows that, in order to 
meet the acceptable level, of cost-effectiveness, manufacturers often have to accept a lower price 
than that being applied on an international level.  This happens in Australia, where in some instances 
the PBAC will only recommend listing if the manufacturer lowers the price. It is also beginning to 
happen in the UK, through the patient access schemes. Also, as a result of using economic 
evaluation, therapy is being delivered in a more targeted way. Depending on the jurisdiction, 
between 15 and 20 per cent of drugs are rejected for reimbursement altogether. Around another 20 
to 30 per cent are reimbursed only for a sub-set of the patient population. Targeting medicines to 
those patients that will benefit most is probably the main way in which a more cost-effective use of 
healthcare resources has been obtained.  
 
The comparison of experience in the US and the UK with the reimbursement of anti-cancer drugs 
illustrates the consequences of applying stringent cost-effectiveness criteria. In a study of all anti-
cancer drugs licensed by the FDA since 2004, all were reimbursed in the USA, often with no 
restrictions, whereas in the UK much greater restrictions on use were applied (Mason et al, 2010) 
(see Figure 4). It is possible that such restrictions could have been applied without the existence of a 
body like NICE, but, given the emotion surrounding end-of-life care, the most likely alternative 
scenario would be postcode rationing, as existed in the past.  
 
 
 
Source: Mason et al (2010) 
Figure 4.  Coverage restrictions for eligible anticancer drugs,  FDA approved 2004 2008 
 
The restrictions on access in countries like the UK raise the question of what, if any, impact the 
incorporation of economic evaluation into reimbursement decisions has had on the equity of 
healthcare provision. In the UK, NICE was founded, in part, to deal with geographical inequity. As a 
result, the provision of costly high-profile drugs is more even across the country than it was before. 
However, as was mentioned earlier, NICE has only sought to standardise which new drugs are 
adopted, not what is displaced as a result.  
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In addition, in commenting on the differences between the US and UK, Malin (2010) observed that 
two quite different rationing processes were being applied, the one in the US being driven by co-pay 
ĂƐ ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŽ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ^ŚĞ ƌĞŵĂƌŬĞĚ ?  “tĞ ŚĂǀĞ ĂĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ŽǁĞ ƵƐĞ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ŚĞůƉ ƵƐ
reach consensus on what we are willing to pay for new therapies and innovation, or do we leave 
individual patients to wrestle with the skyrocketing costs of cancer care and treatment determined 
ďǇƚŚĞŝƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƉĂǇ ? ? 
 
The impact of economics-driven reimbursement processes on vertical equity within healthcare is 
difficult to assess. Much of the debate has centred on value judgements behind the construction and 
use of the quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) measure. This debate is currently unresolved, but the 
indications are that the simple application of equally-weighted QALYs may not adequately reflect 
societal preferences for the allocation of healthcare resources.   
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7. Conclusions   
Before the introduction of economic evaluation as a formal part of the reimbursement process for 
drugs, a range of arrangements existed across different jurisdictions. These included reimbursement 
based on clinical criteria alone and price controls. Some jurisdictions had no controls on the price or 
reimbursement of drugs and any restrictions on access were merely a result of general budgetary 
restrictions or local formulary decisions.  
  
The changes in the structure of reimbursement policies necessary to incorporate economic 
evaluation have been accomplished without major difficulty in most jurisdictions. However, several 
methodological differences in international guidelines for economic evaluation exist, only some of 
which can easily be justified.  
  
Several changes in reimbursement processes have taken place in those jurisdictions incorporating 
economic evaluation. Some difficulties in making and evaluating economic submissions have 
occurred, although in the main this has been a smooth transition. A number of beneficial changes 
have been observed, such as a trend towards requiring the measurement of more meaningful 
clinical endpoints and increased engagement between manufacturers, drug regulators and payers. 
The extent to which these changes can be attributed to the introduction of economic evaluation is 
variable.  
  
Various studies of changes in reimbursement decisions have been conducted. A consistent finding is 
that economic considerations (eg. the size of the ICER) have been influential, second only to the 
strength of the clinical evidence for the drug of interest. Where decisions in different jurisdictions 
have been compared, differences in the decision outcomes have been observed. However, in many 
cases these differences can be explained. However, the same evidence package does not guarantee 
the same decision in all jurisdictions, because of differences in local circumstances.   
  
The most important question is whether the incorporation of economic considerations into the drug 
reimbursement process has led to a more efficient and/or equitable allocation of healthcare 
resources. This is difficult to ascertain because of the difficulties in specifying the counterfactual and 
the fact that little is known about the extent to which reimbursement decisions actually lead to 
changes in healthcare practice.  
  
Nevertheless, given the increasingly high prices of many new drugs (eg. in areas such as cancer) and 
the difficulties in obtaining substantial improvements in health gain, it is likely that the explicit 
consideration of costs and benefits has moved us closer to an efficient and equitable allocation of 
resources than the policies that existed in the past. In social insurance systems, the systems in most 
of the jurisdictions adopting this policy, an evidence-based system of pricing and reimbursement for 
drugs, considering societal willingness-to-pay, is a reasonable policy objective to pursue.  
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